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Developing Academic Strategic Alliances: Reconciling Multiple
Institutional Cultures, Policies, and Practices
Abstract
Colleges and universities have often been required to evolve in response to shifting societal priorities. Over the
past century, this occurred in the context of an ever-expanding system of higher education built with a
substantial investment of public money. If society needed more professional programs, institutions added
them. In the current context, however, the expectation of institutional accountability remains undiminished
despite an increasingly resource-constrained environment. This places colleges and universities in a double
bind. They are expected to address society's needs, yet they often do not have the resources to respond to
them. Our institutions of higher learning are limited in the ways they can generate additional capital, and
efforts to free resources by reducing administrative overhead and reallocating responsibilities have often
produced pyrrhic victories (Eckel, 2003).
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The Promise of Interinstitutional Collaboration
Colleges and universities have often been required
to evolve in response to shifting societal priorities. Over the past cen-
tury, this occurred in the context of an ever-expanding system of higher
education built with a substantial investment of public money. If society
needed more professional programs, institutions added them. In the cur-
rent context, however, the expectation of institutional accountability re-
mains undiminished despite an increasingly resource-constrained envi-
ronment. This places colleges and universities in a double bind. They are
expected to address society’s needs, yet they often do not have the re-
sources to respond to them. Our institutions of higher learning are lim-
ited in the ways they can generate additional capital, and efforts to free
resources by reducing administrative overhead and reallocating respon-
sibilities have often produced pyrrhic victories (Eckel, 2003).
Developing Academic Strategic Alliances:
Reconciling Multiple Institutional 
Cultures, Policies, and Practices
However, one promising means for developing new capacities is the
creation of strategic partnerships between colleges and universities.
Such arrangements are well documented in the management literature.
Termed interorganizational relationships (IORs), such collaborative en-
terprises assume a variety of forms (Bailey & McNally Koney, 2000;
Barringer & Harrison, 2000). They may be differentiated from one an-
other on a number of dimensions, including: (a) the financial support
contributed by each partner, (b) the extent to which the organizational
and/or governance structure is formalized and centralized, and (c) the
relative contribution of each partner in the development and production
of a given good or service. In this study, we focus on academic IORs that
are strategic in nature (i.e., they extend beyond the mere sharing of li-
brary books or bulk purchasing or similar consortia activities) and have
been “established for a variety of reasons relating to the inability of one
of the partners to solve an important problem” (Borys & Jemison, 1989,
p. 241). To put it simply, they are working together because no single
partner can accomplish what it seeks on its own.
The management literature on strategic alliances points out that they
are formed for a variety of reasons (Gulati & Singh, 1998) and notes that
the rationales for holding them together may shift over time (Spekman,
Forbes, Isabella, & MacAvoy, 1998). Alliances open doors to markets by
pooling financial and human resources, thereby producing new combina-
tions of products, services, and expertise (Bailey & McNally Koney,
2000; Gulati & Singh, 1998; Hagadoorn, 1993; Oliver, 1990). They ex-
tend capabilities, improve the delivery of services, generate greater
economies of scale, and reduce expenses by linking complementary tech-
nologies or sharing facilities and capacities and jointly investing in new
innovations, such as technology (Bailey & McNally Koney, 2000; Borys
& Jemison, 1989; Gulati & Singh, 1998; Hagadoorn, 1993; Whetten,
1981). Alliances have been shown to facilitate the development of new
ideas and products and allow participating organizations to “leapfrog”
into new areas (Gulati & Singh, 1998; Hagadoorn, 1993). Partners that
join together learn from one another (Doz, 1996; Hagadoorn, 1993),
which is an advantage since buying knowledge and expertise in the mar-
ketplace can be prohibitively expensive (Barringer & Harrison, 2000).
Together, organizations may find it easier to monitor the changing envi-
ronment and better understand emerging opportunities or risks (Gulati &
Singh, 1998; Hagadoorn, 1993). Alliances may also be formed to defend
a current strategic position (Barringer & Harrison, 2000). Finally, an or-
ganization may join an alliance to gain legitimacy through association
with others, particularly larger, visible, reputable, and prestigious firms
(Bailey & McNally Koney, 2000; Barringer & Harrison, 2000). 
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However, managing IORs in the private sector has proven remarkably
challenging. Park and Russo (1996) cite a series of studies that put the
failure rate of strategic corporate alliances at 7 in 10, 2 in 3, and 1 in 2.
This uneven history of success points to two principal challenges. First,
a successful alliance requires participants to reconcile their organiza-
tional goals and to develop clear and compatible expectations (Doz,
1996). This is easier said than done, however, because not only do part-
ners enter the alliance for different reasons, they often harbor divergent
objectives (e.g., one may wish to expand market share while the other is
interested in maximizing revenues). The absence of shared assumptions
can make reconciling such differences challenging (Borys & Jemison,
1989). Second, partners may have different organizational norms about
decision making (Rondinelli & London, 2001)—their operating proce-
dures, policies, and governance structures (Borys & Jemison, 1989; Sax-
ton, 1997) and their accepted means of establishing trust (Ring & Van de
Ven, 1994) may therefore be difficult to reconcile. In a real sense, the
central challenge of IORs is addressing disparate sets of values and as-
sumptions—that is, reconciling organizational cultures.
Academic Alliances
Colleges and universities have a long history of collaborating (Martin
& Samels, 2002; Whealler Johnson & Noftsinger, 2004) through consor-
tia and exchange agreements, shared resources, coordinated curricula
(such as 2+3 programs and articulation agreements), athletic confer-
ences, and joint research. These traditional partnerships differ in impor-
tant ways from the interinstitutional programs in this study. The first
tend to be operational in nature, more concerned with efficiencies (doing
things better or cheaper) than with effectiveness (creating new activities
in response to a changing environment; Pfeffer & Salancik, 1978). They
extend and enhance the existing capacities of the partners. Sharing li-
brary resources, joint purchasing, or cross-enrollments of students ex-
emplify these kinds of arrangements (Dotolo & Strandness, 1999). 
This research focuses on a particular type of strategic alliance, what
we call curricular joint ventures (CJVs; Eckel, Hartley, Affolter-Caine,
2004), which are partnerships where two or more institutions collabo-
rate with one another—including making shared financial investments
(thus assuming shared financial risks)—to develop an academic venture
neither partner could launch on its own (Dussauge & Garrette, 1999;
Hamel, 1996; Porter, 1996).1 Although there are an increasing number
of examples, higher-education alliances have been inadequately studied,
especially curricular alliances. Further, what little has been written tends
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to be speculative and anecdotal (see, e.g., Dotolo & Strandness, 1999;
Martin & Samels, 2002; Whealler Johnson & Noftsinger, 2004). In this
qualitative study, we gathered data from several existing CJVs to begin
identifying the factors that influenced their formation and management.
We pursued the following questions: How do institutions create mutu-
ally beneficial curricular joint ventures despite differences in institu-
tional cultures, policies, and practices? How do alliances address in-
evitable conflicts and differences among the parent organizations?
Using the Rules of Organizational Culture 
Effective academic strategic alliances depend on partners’ ability not
only to regularize processes and procedures but also to understand and
reconcile multiple sets of norms and expectations (Borys & Jemison,
1989; Rondinelli & London, 2001; Saxton, 1997). We therefore have
drawn from the literature on organizational culture to examine the fac-
tors that influence these partnerships. Organizational culture is “the
deeply embedded patterns of organizational behavior and the shared val-
ues, assumptions, beliefs, or ideologies that members have about their
organization or its work” (Peterson & Spencer, 1991, p. 142) that reflect
the key assumptions, understandings, and rules that govern daily behav-
ior (Deal & Kennedy, 1982). An organization’s culture can be conceptu-
alized as three interrelated levels (Schein, 1992). At its deepest level,
culture consists of the underlying assumptions (often implicit and un-
stated) that guide behaviors. Culture becomes discernible in part
through espoused values—the beliefs and priorities of people in a par-
ticular institutional context.2 Finally, most evident are the artifacts of
culture—policy documents, mission statements, and so forth (Schein,
1992). 
For this study, we adopted a social rules system framework (Burns &
Flam, 1987; March, 1994) to unearth operating cultural norms by docu-
menting the formal and informal “rules” embedded in organizational
life. Social rule systems theory holds that members of organizations de-
velop rules for regularizing their work and mitigating confusion and
conflict. The scaffolding of such rules reveals a great deal about shared
norms and values, that is, organizational culture. Social rules signifi-
cantly influence people’s expectations about participating in decision
making, establish participant obligations and rights, set parameters for
work activities, and act as a guide to determine feasible outcomes
(Burns & Flam, 1987; March, 1994; March, Schulz, & Zhou, 2000).
Rules may be the expression of past political solutions (the agreements
from negotiations between organization actors) or technical solutions
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(guidelines regarding what procedures seem to work). They may be ei-
ther formal or informal (Burns & Flam, 1987). Formal rules are found in
policy guidelines or memoranda of understanding and are readily acces-
sible cultural artifacts (Schein, 1992). Other rules, however, are implic-
itly understood as “the way we do things around here.” These rules (and
the underlying assumptions that guide them [Schein, 1992]) are ob-
scured until a decision reveals them. 
Identifying rules that guide behavior is an effective strategy for gaining
insights into the beliefs, assumptions, and norms of institutional mem-
bers (Helms Mills & Mills, 2000). Organizational culture, from this per-
spective, is “primarily composed of a particular configuration of ‘rules’
enactment and resistance” (Mills, 1988, p. 366). CJV development offers
particularly rich opportunities to observe rule making and rule following
since partners must reconcile the dominant and accepted rules of opera-
tion of at least two organizations (Doz, 1996). As strategic alliances
form, partners construct a common set of rules in two ways. First,
prospective partners may begin by applying the rules from their individ-
ual organizational “rule pool” (March, 1994) to the new situation (Doz,
1996). Negotiation is the inevitable result because the rules each partner
brings to the alliance reflect the disparate learning and histories of each
institution (March, Schulz, & Zhou, 2000). Second, the alliance must cre-
ate new rules to address the unique situations created by the nascent col-
laboration. Rules are thus the result of problem solving, political negoti-
ation, experiential learning, and diffusion (March, Schulz, & Zhou, 2000)
that in alliances occur both collectively and prior to the partnership.
It is this second set of rules that are of particular interest here. These
rules require what Ronald Heifetz (1994) calls adaptive (as opposed to
technical) responses. The real work for institutional leaders, he argues, is
responding to adaptive challenges where no technical or tested solution
exists. In the following analysis, we make no attempt to address the vast
majority of CJV rules, which address basic operations because they tend
to be based on the structure and nature of each alliance and, more impor-
tant, are of little utility in understanding the core challenge facing these
alliances—reconciling disparate organizational cultures and perceptions
of purpose. Our intent is to focus on the development of rules that recon-
cile the organizational values and cultural assumptions of the partners.
Methodology
We employed a comparative case study methodology, focusing on a
contemporary, real-life phenomenon (Yin, 1994) and drawing insights
from the cases we developed on each CJV (Herriott & Firestone, 1983).
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Site Selection and Data Collection
We selected three CJVs that represented common IOR structures to
maximize variation (Patton, 1990): (a) a dyad (Virginia Tech–Wake For-
est University School of Biomedical Engineering and Sciences [SBES]);
(b) a medium-sized network of 5 institutions (OneMBA); and (c) a large
network of 10 institutions (Great Plains Interactive Distance Education
Alliance [Great Plains IDEA]). Single shared programs are provided by
SBES and OneMBA, and Great Plains IDEA offers multiple degree pro-
grams from a single collaborative structure. We also identified CJVs that
were serving increasing numbers of students and were financially vi-
able. On these dimensions at least, the CJVs were successful. 
From each CJV we identified: (a) the current leaders of the effort, (b)
the individuals from each institution responsible for initiating that part-
ner’s involvement in the CJV, and (c) faculty who participate in the aca-
demic activities related to the venture. We also engaged in snowball or
network sampling by following up with names of individuals provided
by the primary contact (Patton, 1990). Ultimately, we conducted be-
tween 7 and 15 interviews for each CJV for a total of 30 interviews. We
concluded interviewing respondents for each site when we reached data
saturation (Glaser & Strauss, 1967) and the redundancy of information
from additional respondents yielded no new information. We also re-
quested documents prior to the interviews such as meeting agendas,
minutes of meetings, Web pages, handbooks, white papers, and reports.
In addition, we observed one executive board planning retreat and con-
ducted site visits to two campus partners. Because the CJVs studied
spanned numerous organizations (and sometimes crossed national
boundaries), we conducted many of the individual interviews by phone.
All interviews were semistructured and aimed to elicit from participants
their individual perspectives about their own roles in the formation and
maintenance of the CJV (Rubin & Rubin, 1995). The protocol consisted
of open-ended questions (Yin, 1994), although we also used the “overlap
method,” seeking multiple perspectives on particularly important issues
and events that emerged (Lincoln & Guba, 1985). The interviews were
tape recorded. We transcribed interviews verbatim for two cases and cre-
ated interview logs for the third case.
Data Analysis
We drafted case reports or written condensations of all the data col-
lected (approximately 60 pages each) for each CJV that included all of
the potentially relevant material collected from the participating sites
(Yin, 1994). The case reports allowed us to put into chronological order
all of the information from each site to facilitate coding, identify gaps in
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the process, and look for points of convergence and divergence within
the data to piece together the story of CJV development. They allowed
us to identify points of high convergence in the data, highlight inconsis-
tencies, and minimize unnecessary redundancy. We then pattern coded
each case, looking to identify adaptive rules (Heifetz, 1994). Within the
cases, we looked both for formal or explicit rules and for informal or im-
plicit rules for each area. The formal rules predominately came from
written documents, such as handbooks and policy statements, but also
through the interviews. Implicit, informal rules surfaced when conflict
arose between partners or between the alliance and individual institu-
tions (March, 1994). Most of these were identified through the inter-
views. However, often new rules pointed to conflicts resolved. 
Finally, we conducted a cross-case analysis. Independently, each re-
searcher drafted rule memos from two of the cases (OneMBA and Great
Plains IDEA) that pulled identified rules into a thematic cluster across
the cases, and together we developed a set of propositions (Miles & Hu-
berman, 1994) regarding cultural, adaptive rules in CJVs from those two
cases. We used the third case, SBES, as a means to further refine the ini-
tial propositions. 
The research questions led to findings best described in terms of pat-
terns and themes rather than confirmed hypotheses and explanations that
were tested against common sense and plausibility rather than against
predictive theories, both of which are common in the organization case
study method (Pettigrew, 1995).
Rigor and Limitations 
We adhered to Yin’s (1994) three principles of rigor for case study re-
search: (a) the use of multiple sources of evidence, (b) the construction
of a database of information or case report specifically for the case
study, and (c) the development of a logical chain of evidence describing
the rationale and the processes used that connects the findings to the col-
lected data. 
Any study is bound to have limitations; it is what makes the study
manageable (LeCompte & Preissle, 1993). One limitation is the number
of cases in this study. We identified three different types of alliances that
involved research universities. Although the alliances are different, they
are by no means representative of the possible approaches to curricular
alliances, particularly to those pursued by other types of institutions
such as liberal arts colleges or community colleges. A second limitation
is the potential for participant biases and misperceptions common in or-
ganizational research (Van Maanen, 1979). Some of the participants in
our study were heavily invested in the alliance and actively working to
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make it succeed. No doubt this colored their perspectives on the initia-
tive. However, others (e.g., some faculty members and recently hired ad-
ministrators) were less so. Asking participants to reflect on their own ac-
tivities rather than simply having them speak generally about the overall
enterprise and identifying people with different roles within the CJV
provided a broader range of perspectives than we would have had had
we conducted elite interviews (Holstein & Gubrium, 1995). Although
individual accounts may have been somewhat biased, we mitigated this
by eliciting information from multiple participants in the CJV. Finally,
the documents we reviewed were not produced for research purposes.
Thus, they cannot be taken as literal recordings of events because they
had other purposes than a desire to objectively inform such as persua-
sion or creating a commitment to action (Merriam, 1988).
An Overview of Three CJVs
Virginia Tech–Wake Forest University School of 
Biomedical Engineering and Sciences (SBES)
The SBES institution is a single graduate school jointly operated by a
public land-grant university and a private university located in different
states. This improbable partnership combines Virginia Tech’s strengths
in engineering with Wake Forest’s medical school. The graduate pro-
grams at SBES offer students M.S. and Ph.D. degrees in biomedical en-
gineering, a joint M.D./Ph.D. through the WFU School of Medicine, and
a joint D.V.M./Ph.D. program through the Virginia-Maryland Regional
College of Veterinary Medicine. Students designate a home campus in
either Blacksburg, Virginia, or Winston-Salem, North Carolina. The
school’s first cohort included 30 graduate students from both institu-
tions, half of whom were doctoral students. Approximately two-thirds
were enrolled through Virginia Tech and the rest from Wake Forest. Cur-
rently, the curriculum is comprised of existing courses offered by each
institution and new courses developed specifically for SBES. Because
the institutions are a two hours’ drive apart, some courses are taught via
distance learning. The core faculty of SBES consists of 20 professors
from Virginia Tech and 10 from Wake Forest, with more than 60 faculty
affiliates. Five additional faculty members, whose primary appointment
will be at SBES, are being hired. The collaboration promotes interinsti-
tutional faculty research, linking faculty from medicine and engineering.
A primary goal of the partnership (along with the joint degree program)
is to be able to compete more effectively for National Institutes of
Health (NIH) grants by drawing upon the strengths of faculty from the
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two disciplines. The day-to-day administration of SBES is undertaken
by its director and associate director (one from each campus). They re-
port to a governing board, which provides oversight of the program and
approves school policy. The board consists of eight voting members di-
vided equally between the two institutions. The deans of several schools
(e.g., the graduate school, college of engineering, school of medicine)
serve as permanent members of the board, by virtue of their positions.
Department chairs rotate annually to fill the remaining slots.
OneMBA
The OneMBA venture is a 21-month executive MBA program (its in-
augural class began in fall 2002) that was created to deliver an interna-
tionally focused MBA program to executives of multinational corpora-
tions. Partners include the Kenan-Flagler Business School of the
University of North Carolina, Chapel Hill (UNC); the Rotterdam School
of Management (RSM) of Erasmus University Rotterdam; the Chinese
University of Hong Kong (CUHK); the Monterrey Tech Graduate
School of Business Administration and Leadership (EGADE) in Mex-
ico; and Brazil’s Escola de Administração de Empresas de São
Paulothe largest of the schools that make up the Fundação Getulio
Vargas (FGV). The OneMBA program is a globally focused executive
MBA program that each partner realized it could not independently de-
liver with the same international depth. Only through collaboration
across national borders, the principals thought, could they provide a
real-life (as opposed to “academic”) experience for graduate business
students seeking a global experience. Students enroll at one of the part-
ner institutions and pay that institution’s tuition and fees. The curricu-
lum includes three components: (a) a series of courses taught by the stu-
dent’s home institution, (b) a “global residency” that consists of
weeklong visits to four world regions for programs designed to address
a topic important to the area, and (c) a set of globally coordinated
courses taught concurrently at each partner institution using parallel syl-
labi and virtual global project teams drawing students from each of the
five participating institutions. Upon completing their course work, stu-
dents receive both an MBA degree from their home institution and a
OneMBA diploma or certificate issued jointly by the five participating
institutions.
The alliance is coordinated by an administrative group comprised of
at least one faculty and one senior staff member (assistant or associate
deans) as well as program managers or directors from each of the five
partner institutions. This group formulates the strategic direction of the
program, develops the curriculum and program infrastructure, and over-
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sees the management of the joint activities. It also makes decisions
about joint marketing, program structure and offerings, and financial is-
sues affecting the partnership. 
In addition to the executive committee, OneMBA has four technical
teamsmarketing, logistics, admissions, and technologywhich coor-
dinate activities in these areas. The logistics and admissions teams are
composed primarily of executive committee members. The marketing
and technology teams draw from the relevant area experts in the partner
schools. In addition, there are cross-institution working groups for each
of the globally coordinated courses. Led by a faculty coordinator, each
working group has created a common syllabus and identified common
readings and case studies. They jointly oversee the global virtual teams
across their courses and collaboratively grade team projects.
Each partner remains responsible for certain activities. For example,
institutions determine their own admissions criteria and processes,
though suggested guidelines have been set by the executive committee.
Each school conducts its own orientation prior to a joint opening week.
The institutions recruit their own faculty members to teach courses and
negotiate compensation rates. Finally, each partner develops and offers
its own portion of the curriculum through the regional courses.
Great Plains IDEA
In the mid-1990s, the Colleges of Human Sciences (sometimes called
Colleges of Human Ecology) at 10 western and midwestern universities
(Colorado State University, Iowa State University, Kansas State Univer-
sity, Michigan State University, Montana State University, University of
Nebraska, North Dakota State University, Oklahoma State University,
South Dakota State University, and Texas Tech University) established
the Great Plains Interactive Distance Education Alliance (Great Plains
IDEA) in order to develop cost-neutral distance education graduate pro-
grams in fields in which individual partners did not offer degrees be-
cause they lacked the complete content expertise to offer a full program.
In 2001, a subset of the Great Plains IDEA institutionsKansas State
University, Montana State University, Iowa State University, South
Dakota State University, North Dakota State University, Oklahoma State
University, and the University of Nebraskabegan offering an online
master’s degree in family financial planning. The alliance is developing
additional graduate degree and certificate programs in gerontology,
youth development, and merchandising. Students enroll in an alliance
program through one of the partner institutions. All students, regardless
of home institution, pay a common price for these courses. The partners
have created an income-sharing formula that distributes income in three
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ways: (a) to the institution teaching a given course, (b) to the student’s
home institution for program contributions and student services, and (c)
to the Great Plains IDEA for program coordination and joint activities
such as marketing and maintaining its Web site. Students graduate with
a degree from their home institution. 
An executive board composed of one member from each partner insti-
tution coordinates the alliance. The board has an elected chair and is
largely comprised of assistant or associate deans from the partner
schools, though some faculty, deans, and department chairs have been
selected by their institutions to represent their interests. The meetings
rotate among partner institutions or are held in conjunction with other
national professional meetings.
In addition to the leadership and coordination provided by the execu-
tive board, the alliance designates one partner as the “Lead Institution.”
The Lead Institution is responsible for managing the alliance’s finances,
including collecting and expending funds and maintaining correct and
complete books and records of accounts, and it assumes a leadership
role in coordinating alliance activities.
Each partner institution can decide the programs in which it would
like to teach and offer degrees and/or certificates. Any partner institution
can propose a degree program, though it must take the lead in gaining
program approval from the alliance. Within each Great Plains IDEA pro-
gram, faculty from participating institutions work together to design the
curriculum and develop courses. Each institution also develops the cor-
responding employment and compensation agreements under which its
faculty teach Great Plains IDEA courses. Institutions also are responsi-
ble for admitting, advising, and working with enrolled students. They
field questions from prospective students, maintain student records, up-
hold university policy, and conduct graduation audits.
The Rules Essential to Key Alliance Tasks
The following discussion outlines the most prominent adaptive rules
that emerged from our examination of these CJVs. We present the find-
ings through an emergent framework grounded in the realities of creat-
ing and managing alliances. This is appropriate since the phenomena of
academic alliances have not been sufficiently studied. In the analysis
that follows we point to clearly discernible patterns of rule creation to
negotiate different organizational cultures by these CJVs in each of
these areas. The chief issues regarding the coordination of these CJVs
were (a) identifying partners, (b) developing and delivering the curricu-
lum, (c) making operational decisions and resolving emergent conflicts,
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and (d) balancing individual and collective partner interests. These ac-
tivities closely mirror the key issues in private-sector strategic alliances
of (a) managing coordinated operations (Borys & Jemison, 1989; Gulati
& Singh, 1998; Rondinelli & London, 2001), (b) determining partner in-
vestments in the alliance and dividing returns (Spekman, Forbes, Is-
abella, & MacAvoy, 1998; Ring & Van de Ven, 1994), and (c) demarcat-
ing boundaries between alliance and partner responsibilities (Borys &
Jemison, 1989).
Finding Partners
The first task of any joint venture is finding a suitable partner (or part-
ners) with which to work. The CJVs in the study were guided by selec-
tion rules largely based on shared values rather than maximizing return
on investment.
A key characteristic of desirable partners was shared ambitions. Vir-
ginia Tech and Wake Forest discovered an immediate affinity because
both aspired to become “players” in the fierce competition for NIH dol-
lars. This ambition influenced the development of further rules such as
the “cluster hiring” of faculty. While cluster hiring had obvious utilitar-
ian value—creating a critical mass of researchers in key strategic
areas—it also was intended to send a signal to external constituents
(e.g., foundations) and competitors that the program was a national con-
tender. As one administrator noted, cluster hiring is an effective strategy
for “gaining national prominence really quickly.”
The OneMBA program reflected the shared desire of participating
partners to offer a truly international MBA with an international experi-
ence. Julie Yu of the Chinese University of Hong Kong enthused,
The Chinese University’s MBA programs are focused upon four core values:
globalization, relevance, innovation, and quality. OneMBA is the first pro-
gram offered by CUHK which truly captures the spirit of globalization in
today’s dynamic world. The global residencies demonstrate best business
practices in both developed and emerging economies. During these week-
long experiential trips, executive participants can directly draw from the
concepts that have been discussed in the globally coordinated courses imme-
diately preceding the residencies. Innovation and quality are clearly demon-
strated in this premier global executive MBA program. It is obvious that our
core values are very well expressed in this particular program, so the
OneMBA is a great fit for us. Shared values and cultural norms proved im-
portant for establishing compatibility.
Wake Forest and Virginia Tech are vastly different institutions. One is
a private, liberal arts institution with a medical school, and the other is a
public polytechnic institute with a renowned engineering program. Nev-
ertheless, both have an intensely entrepreneurial ethos, as evidenced by
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their track record of innovative practices. For example, Virginia Tech
took the lead in a remarkable venture that created a public veterinary
school supported jointly by Virginia and Maryland. It also launched a
business incubator and created a partnership with an area hospital. Wake
Forest’s president had promoted greater interdisciplinary teaching and
research. This shared commitment to innovation was in evidence at an
early meeting between the leadership of the two institutions. A Wake
Forest faculty member who attended recalled his president saying: “In
the future there will be 30 to 50 big time research institutions in this
country. We’re going to be one of them and these places will be defined
by their strategic alliances. That’s why we are committed to doing this
program.”
For OneMBA, all of the partners greatly valued institutional excel-
lence (reflected, e.g., in external rankings). Said one UNC faculty mem-
ber, “We don’t just want any partner; we want the top-notch partner. We
want somebody who is considered a leader in its region.” They also
found partners who shared the same philosophical beliefs about gradu-
ate business education. Said Penny Oslund of UNC,
I think it is very important that you share similar philosophies. I think that
we have been able to avoid a lot of hurdles because of that. . . . [W]e had
looked at [prospective partners’] curriculums very carefully. We knew that
we were pretty much on the same page with what we felt should be offered.
Our dean at the time had a colleague in Japan. We spent part of a day with
him. The programs were so different! Theirs was like an eight- or nine-
month program and it just never would have worked. There obviously needs
to be a sort of [common] foundation on which to build.
A key strategy identifying institutions with similar sets of values and
priorities was tapping established professional or personal networks. For
example, four of the OneMBA partners had already known one another
and had pursued opportunities to collaborate with one another in the
past. At the time of its formation, Chinese University of Hong Kong
chose a dean who was a former doctoral advisee of UNC’s dean, Robert
Sullivan, who in turn had helped EGADE establish its doctoral program.
The key faculty member at EGADE, Alejandro Reulas-Gossi, was a
UNC graduate, and the Brazilian institution FGV and UNC had collabo-
rated on undergraduate programs. The principals of Great Plains IDEA
also had long-standing relationships with one another through various
midwestern professional and scholarly meetings. As Marjorie Kostelnik,
the dean at the University of Nebraska, observed: “You have to know
your partners. You can’t just walk in randomly and say let’s take these
ten schools. . . . You have to have some history, or at least some members
that have history. . . . You don’t just look them up in the phone book.”
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Similarly, faculty members at Virginia Tech and Wake Forest knew one
another because of their professional connections in the biomedical
field. In fact, it was collegial interaction between faculty members from
both institutions at a meeting that spurred the early discussions that led
to the joint program.
It is worth noting that none of these institutions used a set of maxi-
mizing criteria to determine their ideal partner. There clearly was a
recognition that a partnership would strengthen the relative position of
the individual institutions or even compensate for a strategic weakness
(as was the case with SBES, where the expertise of both institutions was
necessary to create a biomedical engineering program). However, cold
calculations like the assessment of market potential of the partnership or
weighing the potential strengths and weaknesses of one prospective
partner against another simply did not occur. Instead, the rules shaping
partnership formation focused on identifying shared values as a basis for
a common identity and made use of existing personal relationships.
Curriculum and Instruction
Rules for governing curriculum and instruction—what is taught and
by whom—are perhaps the most central for any academic enterprise.
Each CJV faced the task of developing mutually acceptable academic
programs. One rule that emerged in all three cases was that no program
would be offered without the full support of all parties. However, how
quickly consensus emerged for the curriculum varied among the study
sites. 
For example, the partners in OneMBA had no trouble finding com-
mon ground on their curriculum since all held that an excellent MBA
program had four fundamental building blocks—sourcing, selling, man-
aging, and competing. Nonetheless, putting such a curriculum into place
was complicated by another espoused alliance imperative, “making the
program marketable in each region.” As Mike Page from the Rotterdam
School of Management explained, “The first sense was the recognition
that we wanted to emphasize the global, but we didn’t want to detract
from the local and regional.” To balance the global continuity of
OneMBA with local curricular needs, the CJV established an additional
rule granting each partner a degree of flexibility to develop a subset of
courses exclusive for local students. Thus, Chinese University of Hong
Kong offered a course on trade in China, and the Brazilian partner taught
a course on social responsibility. 
By contrast, Great Plains IDEA lacked any discipline-specific stan-
dard of value because their offerings were broad. To ensure curricular
common ground they devised a process for making decisions about each
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proposed program. Each was presented to the executive committee in
the form of a concept paper that outlined the need for the program, the
potential roles of the various partners, a detailed time line for implemen-
tation, and a financial plan. This ensured that all programs pursued were
consonant with the expectations, priorities, and values of each partner.
Resolving Administrative Conflicts and Seeking 
Compromise 
CJVs face a host of administrative decisions as well. To address these,
each site adopted processes that were largely characterized by discus-
sion, debate, and consensus. The CJVs did not vote in order to resolve
deadlocks, choosing instead to grapple with the problem and devise po-
tential alternatives until each partner was satisfied. Vicki Jones, associ-
ate dean for international relations at FGV, said about OneMBA, “We
make decisions by discussion and consensus. We look at pros and cons.
. . . We were very conscious as to what the outcome would be regarding
the quality of the program for our students.”
This approach had important positive consequences when misunder-
standings occurred. Occasionally, OneMBA participants came into con-
flict because of their distinct international identities and the disparate cul-
tural expectations of the partners. David Ravenscraft of UNC observed,
I was always surprised at where we got stuck. We had the attitude that we
were not going to move on until we resolved the tough issue. It was fine to
talk about something else, but the group kept coming back to resolve the dif-
ficult issue. We often had to take a lot of breaks to discuss things in the halls.
This is where the cultural differences really rise. For example, some Asians
don’t like to argue in public. We were blessed with partners from each insti-
tution that understood the U.S. and could educate the group into the right ap-
proach and let us know when we made cultural mistakes. We had the right
chemistry among the people; that really helps.
Balancing Collective and Individual Partner Interests
A partnership is built on mutual concern but must also account for in-
dividual partner priorities and preferences. The agreement of OneMBA
that the program must “be marketable in each region” proved a chal-
lenging one to accommodate. Beyond allowing for the offering of lo-
cally specific courses, OneMBA also had to reconcile disparate expecta-
tions about program design. The Americans argued that MBA programs
lasting less than 16 months are generally viewed as substandard in the
United States and that global residencies could be no longer than two
weeks for busy American executives. The others finally agreed to ac-
commodate this request. The executive committee of OneMBA also
Developing Academic Strategic Alliances 627
found it important to ask the extent to which a particular decision is
what they labeled as “core or peripheral” to the CJV’s operation. The
former became joint decisions, and the latter were left to individual part-
ners. To make these distinctions they negotiated among themselves.
Vicki Jones of FGV said,
Is it core or peripheral how many pages an assignment is? Is it core or pe-
ripheral that the assignment has to involve original research in every region?
Is it core or peripheral how often the faculty meet or that the faculty make a
certain amount of their decisions together? When we make decisions, deter-
mining what is core and peripheral really helps determine where we put our
efforts. We don’t always agree on what is core or peripheral; [however,] once
we define that, the other decisions become much easier. It keeps us from mi-
cromanaging, from chasing clouds, and it allows us to direct energies into
what are core for our students. 
Great Plains IDEA adopted the rule that when differences emerged on
matters of specific policy, the partners would adopt the most stringent
existing campus policy. For example, one institution required 36 hours
for a master’s degree while another required only 30 hours. They there-
fore adopted the 36-hour standard. As one administrator explained, “We
decided to use the most difficult, the most constraining, the most chal-
lenging set of rules. . . . Otherwise there would be people who say, ‘I
can’t compromise on this’ and when you don’t have any room to com-
promise alliances fall apart.” Such a rule had the twin virtues of under-
scoring the collective commitment to quality and ensuring that no part-
ner would later be haunted by concerns about making undue
compromises.
The CJVs developed other rules aimed at strengthening the collective
while upholding the values and interests of individual partners. For ex-
ample, Great Plains IDEA decided to (a) not offer programs that would
directly compete with the current offerings of individual partners, (b)
focus on finding those areas in which various institutions had insuffi-
cient depth to offer complete programs on their own, and (c) seek to es-
tablish intellectual homes for faculty who felt isolated on a particular
campus. For example, the alliance devised programs such as family fi-
nancial planning and fashion merchandising, because the partners col-
lectively had enough faculty members working in related areas to mount
a degree program but none could do it alone. 
New interpretations of existing policies were established by SBES
in order to promote mutual collaboration. Since the school was an in-
terdisciplinary effort (not only between Virginia Tech and Wake Forest
but also among departments within each institution), a key alteration
occurred in the way that the institutions assigned credit for teaching
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and research activity. At both institutions, departmental success was
determined by credits taught and research dollars secured: But how
would they account for coteaching or joint research? Ultimately, a 
policy of “double-counting” was established. Thus, if two faculty
members from different schools worked together to secure a research
grant, both departments were given permission to “count” that grant
money in its annual report to the provost and both were credited for
that success. 
Institutions also created financial structures that, although different,
allowed them to balance their collective and individual needs. For exam-
ple, Great Plains IDEA thought it important that students pay a common
price for all Great Plains IDEA courses ($350 per credit hour for
2003–04), regardless of the tuition and fees of the teaching institution. It
wanted a fair system, one where no institution could underprice another.
It also created a revenue-sharing formula: 12.5% to admitting/home uni-
versity (where the student enrolls to cover student services and registrar
functions), 12.5% to the alliance to support joint activities, and 75% to
the teaching university (for instructional and associated costs). In con-
trast, rather than avoiding competitive advantage issues within the al-
liance like Great Plains IDEA, OneMBA adopted financial rules that
gave the partners flexibility to set their own pricing in order to compete
vigorously in their local MBA markets. Students pay the tuition set by
the institution through which they enroll. Each institution identified a
price that its own market would bear, not one that would be common (or
“fair” to use a rule from Great Plains IDEA) to all students. This helped
individual alliance members compete in their own markets and set pric-
ing at a level to meet their individual financial objectives. 
Discussion
The experiences of these three CJVs reveal much about how mutually
beneficial curricular partnerships are formed and renegotiated despite
their inevitable differences in institutional policies, practices, and val-
ues. Below we offer five propositions that we believe illuminate the cen-
tral challenge of these partnerships—the reconciliation of disparate or-
ganizational cultures.
P1: By selecting familiar partners who have common ambitions and ob-
jectives rather than partners that might maximize a particular outcome,
institutions establish a set of shared values that allows for easier recon-
ciliation of disruptive differences.
The management literature on strategic alliances underscores that the
best partners are those with similar strategic goals (Dussauge & 
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Garrette, 1999). One would therefore imagine that the sensible ap-
proach to partner selection would be to research scrupulously the
strategic aims of prospective partners and determine their capacity for
maximum contribution to the shared aim. Quite the contrary, these
CJVs looked to partners where there was a natural affinity first. Only
after that did partners attempt to determine if they had common objec-
tives. Although this may appear to be the enactment of a “satisficing”
process in which institutions expend just enough energy to find a part-
ner that meets a basic criteria (i.e., one that is “good enough”) as com-
pared to a maximizing set of criteria (March, 1994), there are good rea-
sons why, as in a human courtship, shared interests and similar social
networks often trump cold economic calculation. Familiarity aids in
identifying partners’ similar sets of norms and values (and conversely
assists in weeding out potential misfits during the preselection process).
This is critically important because a drastic misalignment of expecta-
tions in any number of key areas—curricular structure, teaching qual-
ity, or collaboration on research—is likely to result in gridlock and may
terminate the partnership.
P2: Recognizing the inherent tensions between the interests of the indi-
vidual partners and the collective was a key factor influencing organiza-
tional resilience and stability.
Members of alliances find basic institutional processes such as plan-
ning, developing protocols, setting policy, and even the formation of
working objectives to be familiar activities. Inevitably, partnerships en-
gender certain tensions. The most fundamental is determining which ac-
tivities are being conducted on behalf of the alliance and which are in-
tended to serve the particular partner. Put another way, when may we act
as individuals and when must we confer for the benefit of the collective?
For these CJVs, a commitment to surfacing and addressing these ten-
sions was a key factor in their ongoing viability. 
Time was dedicated by OneMBA to defining activities that were
“core” to the CJV and those that were “peripheral”; the question became
a veritable mantra. Great Plains IDEA struggled over whether each
member could determine which faculty would be assigned to its pro-
grams. Such tensions were not always easily resolved. As SBES’s asso-
ciate director observed when describing the potentially contentious
process of space allocation:
I just said [to my counterpart] just do it and here’s what’s going to happen.
You’re going to have 80% of it right and 20% of it I’m not going to agree
with either because it’s wrong or because I didn’t explain myself properly.
Let’s just face it and deal with it, we’re not going to be angry with each other.
It’s nothing personal.
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In sum, resolution of these issues required open deliberation (and a
sense of equanimity) that engendered shared understandings rather than
the rote operationalization of predetermined collective preference
(Cohen & March, 1986). 
P3: Effective partnerships require a personal commitment built on ongoing
face-to-face interaction rather than watertight policies and procedures.
The processes of developing the coordination rules we describe above
almost exclusively occurred through face-to-face interactions. All of the
CJVs held regular meetings that provided a forum for debating issues,
raising difficult questions, and challenging assumptions. These meetings
tended to be held more frequently during the formational stages of the
CJV. Arranging such meetings was no simple task and involved the
crossing of state lines and, in the case of OneMBA, dealing with na-
tional borders and numerous time zones. An administrator from Kansas
State noted about Great Plains IDEA, “Almost every challenge and bar-
rier has been solved through interpersonal face-to-face interaction and
brainstorming and getting really smart people in the same room focused
on resolving the problem.”
Although the experiences of these CJVs underscore the importance of
establishing clear guidelines, their effective operation intimately relied
on their capacity to establish professional and personal relationships
grounded in mutual trust and a shared sense of purpose. Unlike their
counterparts in many corporate environments, where behavior can be
dictated or at least directed from above, academics, given their profes-
sional authority, cannot be told what to do (Mintzberg, 1993). Thus, rela-
tionships, not organizational hierarchy, become the glue that holds al-
liances together. For instance, SBES’s oversight committee, which is
comprised of faculty and senior administrators from each institution,
was initially established to administer the program. However, over time a
vitally important purpose has emerged. As one senior faculty member re-
marked, “There’s a sense of community about it.” Although the commit-
tee does not meet frequently, its key members are in touch with one an-
other regularly, particularly the director of SBES (a Virginia Tech faculty
member) and the associate director (from Wake Forest). One administra-
tor contrasted SBES with another existing partnership: “That one is very
contractual, to the point where on every issue we have a separate memo-
randum and agreement. There isn’t that level of trust yet. SBES is a true
partnership.” Ultimately, a complex partnership cannot depend on the
manufacturing of a list of guidelines and rigid adherence to formal rules.
What matters instead seems to be the emergence of commonly accepted
values and a sense that the individual institutions are as intent on paying
attention to the well-being of one another as they are for themselves.
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P4: The more alliances are able to create a shared identity, the greater a
chance that conflict will be diminished. 
As we began this study, we anticipated conflict and difficulty between
partners. The management literature on alliances points to the prodi-
gious difficulties of merging the activities of institutions with their own
cultures and habits. Further, it is widely recognized that faculty and ad-
ministrators (both key participants in these alliances) can be at odds with
one another on a single campus, let alone when multiple institutions are
involved. In fact, this was not the case. In general, the conflicts that oc-
curred within and between partner institutions were relatively minimal.
A key mediating factor was the presence of preexisting shared values,
especially shared disciplinary norms.
Each CJV found it vitally important to begin by establishing clear
guidelines for the partnership. This involved the manufacturing of and
steadfast adherence to technical rules. Of course, when faced with unfa-
miliar and challenging situations, the rules could not cover every contin-
gency. Although it would not have been possible for SBES to pass the
State Council in Virginia without a clearly articulated agreement, deci-
sions have increasingly come to be guided more by a collective sense of
appropriateness than by slavish reliance on a policy manual. As one par-
ticipant noted, “We had an attorney go through everything but in the end,
you know, I think what matters is trust—very quickly we have come to
trust one another and to see things in the same way. We know what we
mean by the agreement, the spirit of it.”
This ability to intuit the “spirit” of the agreement reflects a shared
sense of purpose derived from a common, joint identity. The joint efforts
surface challenges that technical rules cannot address; thus the shared
identity serves as a common platform to explore possible appropriate
rules (March, 1994).
Sometimes institutional cultures were a source of shared values.
Members of OneMBA had a shared commitment to entrepreneurialism
and prized prestige. There were also disciplinary bonds. The principals
of OneMBA all had a common business-scholar background. It is per-
haps no surprise that they ended up with a very short set of formal rules.
Similarly, the core faculty members at SBES had a shared understanding
of what an exemplary biomedical engineering program ought to look
like. In both of these instances, participants already “knew” what cur-
riculum to offer, what ideas students should be exposed to, how they
ought to coordinate various curricular activities, and so forth. A quota-
tion from Julie Yu at OneMBA describing the easy agreement on the
basic curricular elements of its program is instructive. She said, “Any
[MBA] program in the world has to have those basic functional courses
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[leadership and organizational behavior, operations, marketing, finance,
and strategy].” One might say that everyone involved knew not only the
music and the words but also the dance steps.
In the absence of a preexisting set of organizational and disciplinary
values, the formation of a common identity proved harder to cultivate.
Great Plains IDEA retained its thick handbook specifying a long list of
policies and procedures. (Indeed, the CJV had rules about how rules
could be proposed and adopted as well as rules as to who was the keeper
of the rules as codified in the alliance handbook.) Great Plains IDEA’s
principals never developed a strong common identity. Although each
was associated with a similar college with a shared land-grant mission,
the participants had different disciplinary backgrounds and held differ-
ent positions in their respective institutions. One might argue that Great
Plains IDEA had more rules simply because it was a more complex al-
liance, offering more programs and involving more institutions. How-
ever, it is also the case that the very nature of those rules and the degree
to which various procedures were spelled out were qualitatively differ-
ent from SBES and OneMBA. The larger size of the CJV and the ab-
sence of shared disciplinary norms and values made forming a com-
mon identity more difficult. Instead of being able to draw upon shared
identities to make decisions, the partners had to rely on more formal
processes.
Conclusion
The central finding of this study is that paying attention to the rela-
tional aspects of partnership development and maintenance is at least as
important, if not more important, as developing curricula, determining
financial structures, managing operations, and expanding enrollments
and research dollars. In sharp contrast, the management literature tends
to focus on the operational aspects of alliances. The most salient ques-
tion regarding academic alliances is not how do we organize ourselves to
get the job done more effectively but who are we and how do we figure
out how to work well with one another. Against much of the corporate
IOR literature, this study suggests that curricular alliances significantly
depend on establishing a set of principles grounded in a common acade-
mic culture. Forging relationships and forming a shared identity should
rightfully demand more attention than the identification of alliance ob-
jectives or procedures. 
This study offers a different assessment of the notion of finding the
“right” partners. It seems that the most valuable elements regarding
finding partners is to identify those with whom one is familiar, has com-
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mon objectives, and, most important, has a likelihood of developing a
shared identity. The CJVs in this study did not hunt for partners that
would allow them to deliver the best program and then invest time and
energy in creating mechanisms to work together. Instead, they found
partners that were good enough on a technical level, but with whom they
connected strongly. This type of “satisficing” is notably absent in the
corporate alliances described in the literature. One important difference
between the corporate sector and the academic one is that colleges and
universities have little organizational slack to innovate. This fact might
suggest that because they lack the resources to invest broadly in innova-
tion, any useful activity with a trusted partner is worth considering. An-
other possibility is that institutions do not have the resources to look for
the maximizing partner and instead turn to those familiar and trusted. A
final explanation is that they may be able to avoid expenses associated
with the relationship and, instead, can invest in the operations. The more
shared the identity the less reliance on formal rules and the easier it is to
respond to adaptive challenges for which there is no history or script and
thus less cost. Finding ways to minimize the number of formal rules
seemed to simplify collaboration, and having a common identity con-
tributed to this. 
While this research provides important insight to this inadequately
studied phenomenon, it leaves many questions unanswered. In some
cases, the limited sample suggests additional research across institu-
tional types and involving different types of CJVs. Additionally, some
specific questions exist regarding alliances at research universities. For
example, does unique identity always lead to success, by what metrics?
What obstacles can impede success in the face of good intention to de-
velop and nurture a shared sense of identity? Can certain “showstop-
pers” derail identity as the important glue? Do other instances exist
when identity is not significant? Can another type of commitment or
characteristics replace shared identity? These questions, and others, de-
serve further investigation.
Notes
1CJVs have a superficial similarity to traditional 2+3 programs where, for example, a
student at a small liberal arts college might take some foundational course work for two
years but transfer to a university to complete an engineering degree. However, such
arrangements are largely concerned with making efficient use of existing resources
rather than strategically creating new programs. Further, the university is not dependent
upon the liberal arts college and could readily continue the program on its own.
2It should be noted that some espoused values, particularly lofty ideals, may be aspi-
rational and not always perfectly mirrored in organizational behavior.
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